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With food safety a growing concern in agriculture, the structure and management of agricultural supply
chains has become a signiﬁcant policy issue. In turn, agricultural supply chains are often analytically
complex, characterized by feedback and time sensitive, often random parameters. Modern commodity
chains such as wheat handling in Canada are no exception. Recently, the Canadian government classes of
wheat, replacing it by a new wheat segregation system that relies on trust and self-declaration of wheat
type by individual farmers. To maintain food safety as well as operate cost-effectively in this new trust-
based system, wheat handlers may be forced to develop a set of contamination testing strategies to
maintain historical wheat quality and consistency. In contrast to much of the extant literature, this re-
search builds a hybrid optimization-simulation model representing the new Canadian wheat supply
chain, with the goal of identifying cost efﬁcient varietal testing strategies. After solving for a base sce-
nario, sensitivity analysis is conducted on key variables that inﬂuence wheat quality testing strategies.
Our results validate the utility of currently employed wheat quality testing strategies in the Canadian
supply chain.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
With worldwide food safety and quality emerging as a major
policy issue, public and business interest in the sustainability of
food supply chains has increased, and the structure of agricultural
supply chains has grown in importance. Wheat is an essential
staple food for much of the world's population. Canada's histori-
cally strong export position has been buttressed by its reputation
for high quality and consistent wheat exports. But recently a series
of policy changes have been implemented that potentially nega-
tively impact both the quality and integrity of the Canadian wheat
handling system. These changes could generate new wheat quality
risks that would jeopardize the export position of this industry.
Due to this on-going situation, growing attention has been given
to the need for analyzing reactive strategies to mitigate potential
wheat handling risks and maintain the safety of the Canadian
wheat quality assurance system (Blomquist, 2015; Skinner, 2015;
Vanneste, 2012). This research will highlight uncertainties in-
herent in agricultural supply chains and support the analysis ofr B.V. This is an open access article
olan@usask.ca (J. Nolan),
oetz),strategic decisions in these kinds of systems (Musshoff and Hir-
schauer, 2007; Tanure et al., 2013).
While research and analysis on wheat handling strategies is
relatively well developed using numerical simulation methods (Ge
et al., 2015a, 2015b; Wilson and Dahl, 2006, 2008), studies mod-
eling risk mitigation using more formal optimization methods
have been limited. While the inherent uncertainty and complex
structural dynamics of these supply chains often drive researchers
to use simulation methods to generate solutions, the nature and
characteristics of the Canadian wheat handling system actually
facilitates the use of optimization models. This gap in the risk
mitigation literature offers us the chance to explore the utility of
optimization models to help generate new handling strategies in
the evolving Canadian wheat handling system.
The Canadian grain or wheat handling system is a very large
and continuously evolving supply chain. Most of the supply chain
is effectively an economic pyramid, with thousands of dispersed
farmers delivering wheat to dozens of elevators for storage and
blending, which ship grain by rail car to just a handful of Canadian
ocean ports. One of the historic objectives of this agricultural
supply chain has been to ensure that different types or classes of
wheat are blended in an accurate and transparent manner so as to
meet agronomic speciﬁcations in wheat export contracts. The
method in Canada used to facilitate wheat blending has been theunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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gation. Essentially, for many years Canadian wheat has been de-
liberately bred to contain speciﬁc visual characteristics that allow
rapid visual identiﬁcation by a trained wheat grader.
While KVD enabled rapid, dependable, and low-cost segregation
of wheat into functionally different classes or quality types, it also
limited the development of novel traits in wheat. In the KVD sys-
tem, wheat breeders had to incorporate KVD characteristics in their
varietal selection process. As such, the KVD requirements re-
presented a signiﬁcant constraint for wheat breeders that impeded
progress in variety development and slowed the rate of productivity
growth for the wheat sector. Due to on-going breeding costs or
losses associated with this visual identiﬁcation system, interest
grew to replace it by an alternative wheat segregation system
known as VED (Variety Eligibility Declaration). Such a system relies
not on visual distinctions of wheat type, but rather is incentive or
trust based, relying on self-declarations of wheat type as delivered
by individual farmers. While reducing potentially costly breeding
restrictions for wheat, VED can also lead to either accidental or
opportunistic wheat misrepresentation, a situation that can affect
blending accuracy for all system participants. If a variety is mis-
represented as another that is visually indistinguishable, wheat
handlers would not be able to distinguish the varieties from one
another without performing physical testing on a sample. Un-
detected mixing or contamination in this manner will necessarily
reduce wheat value and performance for downstream users.
To identify visually indistinguishable wheat varieties, identiﬁ-
cation testing is required. Current technology is costly and requires
a laboratory setting (Bowler, 2015; Canadian Grain Commission
(CGC), 2009; Zhou, 2015). Considering this, complete testing on
wheat deliveries may be not economically viable over the fore-
seeable future. But if elevators and blenders do not perform full
testing on commodity deliveries, potential contaminations can
occur and will result in system losses. Thus, there is an essential
tradeoff in this evolving supply chain between testing costs and
contamination costs. To pursue cost effectiveness, industry parti-
cipants need to work out a set of effective risk management so-
lutions to determine the optimal balance between these two fac-
tors (Fraser and Monteiro, 2009).
At present, the consequences of these policy changes within
the Canadian wheat handling system are only weakly understood.
Although the industry is aware of the potential importance of the
contamination issue, to date few comprehensive studies have been
done to assess any supply chain contamination risks. As such, to
our knowledge there is no contamination testing currently being
conducted along the wheat supply chain, nor is anyone trying to
quantify the costs of implementing variety testing regimes under
foreseeable but potentially severe contamination situations. What
is clear is that the latter kind of information will be needed to
inform careful logistics decisions, and would be most effective to
have well before any actual contamination undermines the sus-
tainability of the Canadian wheat supply chain.
In this light, the primary objective of this study is to identify a
set of wheat varietal testing strategies that minimize handling
costs within this new Canadian wheat supply chain. First, we build
an optimization model that incorporates the economic incentives
inherent in the new supply chain. Operation of a portion of the
wheat handling system is modeled in this manner, transitioning
from the individual farm up through wheat movements for export.
Subsequently, we identify supply chain participants’ cost functions
and then solve the cost minimization problem associated with
behavioral strategies in the supply chain. Then, sensitivity analysis
of system parameters or variables is conducted to identify how
these optimal testing strategies may be affected by supply chain
participants’ future decision making. The paper ends with a brief
conclusion.2. Optimization vs. simulation: comparing and contrasting the
approaches
Evaluating performance and dependability in modern eco-
nomic systems has become a challenging problem due to the in-
herent complexity found in such systems (Tufﬁn et al., 2007). As
two of the most commonly used solution approaches, both opti-
mization methods as well as numerical simulation analyses are
each associated with speciﬁc strengths. Numerical simulation
analysis offers advantages in modeling actual systems and further
permits the researcher to perform counterfactual experiments in
order to better understand the behavior of the system or to further
assess various functions of the system (Akanle and Zhang, 2008;
Zizka, 2005). But simulation models do not always rely on exact
functional relationships between variables of interest and thus are
not as precise as equivalent optimization solutions (Lewis, 2013).
In contrast to simulation analyses, optimization models almost
always yield a solution that permits a larger design space to be
explored (Gries et al., 2004). Considering its speciﬁc strengths, we
are interested in pursuing an optimization approach to examine
what seems to be the relatively complex system that is the Ca-
nadian wheat supply chain.
There are limitations in the ability of optimization models to
mathematically represent economic systems of interest. One
commonly recognized problemwith optimization methods is their
frequent use of simplifying assumptions which can dilute un-
certainties and realism contained in the system of interest (Hung
et al., 2006). Abstracting from important details limits the use of
mathematical formalisms for the research goals of interest, so the
overall simplicity of a typical optimization model comes at the
expense of generality. When more realistic phenomena are in-
corporated into an optimization model, the model becomes more
general but also more difﬁcult to solve (Lewis, 2013). To prevent
simplicity from weakening the predictive strength of an optimi-
zation model, here we seek a balance between simplicity and
generality when performing this optimization exercise.
Difﬁculties can also be encountered when attempting to in-
clude more sources of uncertainty in an optimization model be-
cause model solutions become more complex as the model grows
more detailed. In turn, this could generate very complicated re-
lationships that have very little practical application (Gries et al.,
2003). Ideally, a good optimization model should be broadly ap-
plicable and yet easy to use and understand. In this study we exert
effort in integrating as much detail as possible while avoiding
excessive complexity. Characterizing and quantifying uncertainties
within the system and converting these characteristics into
mathematical representations are important processes for build-
ing an optimization model of what seems to be a complex system.
In fact, some mathematical constructs are inherently very difﬁcult
to solve. Directly imbedding such elements into this kind of ana-
lysis can render the model unsolvable. To avoid this, here we re-
place certain mathematical formulations of a function with results
from an equivalent simulation exercise, in cases where those re-
sults appear to be dependable and concise. In fact, it is good sci-
entiﬁc practice that optimization and simulation perspectives are
deeply complementary. In the future, we expect to see emergent
modeling approaches in supply chain analysis that combine the
beneﬁcial features of both simulation and optimizations for gen-
eral modeling applications.3. Building a supply chain – model assumptions
Assumptions used in our model are based mainly on prior lit-
erature (Wilson and Dahl, 2002, 2006, 2008), as well as interviews
and discussions with experts (Skinner, 2015; Steinke, 2011;
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models (Ge, 2013; Ge et al., 2015a, 2015b). Of course several of
these assumptions are due to the particulars of the problem being
studied, but in general most are implemented to avoid including
certain functional relationships that might overcomplicate the
model. Our basic assumptions are as follows:
1. A farmer's wheat production and deliveries are consistent
throughout a year, i.e., they are either eligible Canadian Western
Red Spring (CWRS) wheat or non-CWRS (CWRS is the most
common type of wheat grown in Canada and is used as the base
variety here).
2. Test accuracy is 100%.
3. There are no contamination sources other than farmer's
misrepresentation.
4. There is no intentional misrepresentation.1 Farmers make
declarations based on their honest, sometimes incorrect, per-
ception of the variety being grown and delivered.
5. A penalty system will be applied in the case of an offence and
the penalty can be perfectly enforced.
6. When computing costs, the model does not allow for a farmer
or a handler's insurance obtained against loss or damage from
misrepresentation.
For our study, due to the time lag between variety registration
and adoption, we anticipate that in the short run these varieties
will not create an immediate KVD conﬂict with the main varieties
of Western Canada wheat (for example CWRS), since look-alike
varieties have not yet entered the system in large volumes. At
present, there is anecdotal evidence of a few misrepresentation
cases in Canada but policies like truck testing and wheat bin
testing for variety identiﬁcation have not yet been implemented.
In the long run, a conﬂict may be unavoidable if newly registered
visually indistinguishable varieties are allowed to ﬂourish. To-
gether with the visually indistinguishable non-registered varieties,
this increases the likelihood of mix-ups between wheat classes
and thus challenges the function of the wheat quality control
system in western Canada.
Interviews with ofﬁcials in Canada, including the Canadian
Grain Commission (Bowler, 2015; Vanneste, 2012), the Canadian
Wheat Board (CWB) (Steinke, 2011) and other experts in wheat
marketing (Blomquist, 2015; Skinner, 2015) highlight that com-
mingling among visually indistinguishable varieties can un-
expectedly occur at any time and that future quality threats could
in turn be sudden and serious. These individuals also indicated
that stringent testing regimes would very likely be implemented if
there are signiﬁcant contamination threats from farmer mis-
representation. We remind the reader that this research describes
a likely situation within the Canadian wheat handling system of
the foreseeable future. To efﬁciently mitigate these risks before
they can undermine the handling system functionality and in-
tegrity, the development of wheat quality assurance programs will
almost certainly gain strategic emphasis within the supply chain.1 In reality most grain farmers only have 3–6 grain buyers within a reasonable
delivery radius. The elevator managers have memory so the farmer's reputation
will impact their future ability to negotiate price within the repeated selling en-
vironment. A farmer's honest reputation within their community is valuable both
economically and socially. There have also been unlicensed varieties of wheat
available to Canadian farmers for several decades, which yield more but are of a
lower quality than licensed varieties. While minor misrepresentations have been
made, and despite the long term opportunity to misrepresent, this has never been a
large issue. We submit that this experience along with the other anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that intentional misrepresentation is not a problem that needs to be
incorporated into the model.4. Model speciﬁcation
The following notation is introduced for an optimization model
of the wheat supply chain in Canada:
 Variables
α Farmer's misrepresentation rate (FMR hereafter), α≤ ≤0 1
β1 Truck test rate at test point 1, β≤ ≤0 11
β2 Bin test rate at test point 2, β≤ ≤0 12
β3 Railcar test rate4at test point 3, β≤ ≤0 13
β4 Terminal elevator test rate at test point 4, β≤ ≤0 14
m m m, ,1 2 3 Contamination multipliers
 Parameters
q Volume of wheat for a delivery from a farmer, bushels
fp2 Primary elevator's proﬁt loss due to contamination detected
at test point 2, dollars/bushel
fp3 Primary elevator's proﬁt loss due to contamination detected
at test point 3, dollars/bushel
fp4 Primary elevator's proﬁt loss due to contamination detected
at test point 4, dollars/bushel
f1 Penalty for farmer's misrepresentation if detected at test
point 1, dollars/bushel
f2 Penalty for farmer's misrepresentation if detected through
traceability 1, dollars/bushel
f3 Penalty for farmer's misrepresentation if detected through
traceability 2, dollars/bushel
f4 Penalty for farmer's misrepresentation if detected through
traceability 3, dollars/bushel
ce Farmer's risk control effort cost, dollars/bushel
c1,c2,c3,c4 Sample test cost for truck, primary elevator bin, railcar
and terminal elevator bin, dollars/sample.
4.1. Wheat handling system under study
The wheat handling situation considered here is a stylized
rendition of the Canadian wheat supply chain, starting at the farm
level and ending at the point of export. To start this supply chain,
individual farmers are assumed to load and transport full truck-
loads of CWRS wheat to a primary elevator. With the existence of
visually indistinguishable wheat varieties farmers could inad-
vertently deliver a non-CWRS variety. The likelihood of this is
determined by farmers’ individual risk control effort exerted, and
the level of risk control technology. Risk control effort is essen-
tially a measure of the resources an individual farmer puts into
avoiding possible misrepresentation. Risk control technology is a
signal of the capacity a farmer has to control their risks of mis-
representation. Using an exponential functional form for mis-
representation probability (Ge et al., 2015a, 2015b), an individual
farmer's misrepresentation rate is deﬁned as a function of his risk
control effort ce and risk control technology k in the following
manner;
α = ( )−e 1
c
k
e
Note that a higher value of c indicates a higher level of effort
and a lower value of k indicates a higher level of technology. Given
the chosen functional form, Eq. (1) implies diminishing marginal
effect of risk control effort on the probability of misrepresentation
at all effort levels. In particular, when →c k/ 0e , α → 1; and when
→ ∞c k/e , α → 0. Next we detail the key components of our model
of wheat segregation and testing in the supply chain.
Whenwheat is delivered to the primary elevator, several events
occur in a prescribed but realistic sequence as described in Fig. 1.
Farmer
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(4)
Cargo
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Fig. 1. Representation of wheat movement in the Canadian supply chain.
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this topic (Furtan et al., 2003; Johnson and Lin, 2005; Wilson and
Dahl, 2002, 2006), we assume that there are four potential test
points available in the system. These are: (1) a test of wheat on the
truck while unloading into primary elevators; (2) a primary ele-
vator bin test before loading wheat onto railcars; (3) a test of
wheat on the rail car while unloading into terminal; and (4) a
terminal elevator test before loading wheat into the cargo ship. In
addition to these assumed testing points, we also assume that
there are three other places in the supply chain where a trace-
ability mechanism using retained samples could be implemented
to identify sources of contamination. As shown in Fig. 1, tracing
opportunities emerge when contamination is detected at (1) test
point 2 (traceability 1); (2) test point 3 (traceability 2); (3) test
point 4 (traceability 3). The economic argument for adopting a so-
called traceability mechanism is two-fold. First, it allows for the
tracking of affected products in the event of a contamination
problem so as to minimize the system costs of contamination.
Second, it also facilitates allocation of any liability, further im-
proving incentives to maintain wheat quality (Banterle and Stra-
nieri, 2008; Starbird, 2005).Table 1
Wheat contamination, testing and tracing in the supply chain.
Location Process Quantity tested Quantity contaminated Con. d
Truck Test 1 ( β1) β=E q1 1 α=E q2 α=E3
Pri. Bin Con.(m1) / β= ( − )E E m14 1 2 1 /
Pri. Bin Test 2 ( β2) β= ( − )E q E5 2 3 E4 β=E6
RC Con.(m2) / β= ( − )E E m110 2 4 2 /
RC Test 3 ( β3) β= ( − − )E q E E11 3 3 6 E10 =E12
Ter. Bin Con.(m3) / β= ( − )E E m115 3 10 3 /
Ter. Bin Test 4 ( β4)
β
=
( − − − )
E
q E E E
16
4 3 6 12
E15 =E17
RC¼railcar, Pri.¼primary elevator, Ter.¼terminal elevator, Tr.¼traceability, Con.¼conta4.2. Supply chain participants' cost functions
In this analysis, a commingling rate is the ratio of undesired (or
contaminated) wheat contained in a wheat variety or sample.
According to the Canadian Grain Act (Ministry of Justice, 2015), if
the commingling rate of any wheat variety is less than 5%, it is
deemed eligible. But if the commingling rate is greater than 5%,
the sample is considered to be contaminated. If contamination is
detected at any test point in the chain, we assume this con-
taminated wheat will be downgraded to feed wheat (i.e. a less
valuable variety) and diverted from the supply chain. However, if a
contaminated sample is not detected the sample moves further
into the system and will contaminate more formerly eligible
wheat.
The physical movement of wheat in our stylized supply chain is
quantiﬁed and described in Table 1. Each component (marked
from E1 to E18) can generate costs and these components will ul-
timately interact with supply chain participants’ cost functions, as
we shall see later.
To facilitate an efﬁciency comparison between alternative
testing strategies, we consider only variable costs in both the
farmer and elevator's cost functions, which also implicitly assumes
that ﬁxed costs are equal across testing regimes. To start, the
elevator's cost function is composed of the following components:etected Quantity traced (Tr.1/Tr.2/Tr.3) Quantity remained
β q1 / −q E3
/ −q E3
E2 4 =Tr E E.1: 7 6 =Tr E E m.2: /8 13 2 =Tr E E m.3: /9 14 2 −
−
q E
E
3
6
/ −
−
q E
E
3
6
β E3 10 =Tr E E.2: 13 12 =Tr E E m.3: /14 18 3 −
− −
q E
E E
3
6 12
/ −
− −
q E
E E
3
6 12
β E4 15 =Tr E E.3: 18 17 − −
− −
q E E
E E
3 6
12 17
mination.
Table 2
Model variables, parameters and values.
Variables or parameters Values Data sources
Farmer number 180 Assumed
Truck loading capacity 40 t (1470 bushels)a,b,c Assumed
Primary bin number 30 Calculated
Primary bin capacity 250 tonnes Assumed
Railcar number 120d Calculated
Railcar capacity 60 tonnesc Assumed
Terminal bin number 15 Calculated
Primary bin capacity 500 tonnes Assumed
Sample test cost $400/truck, $1200/primary
bin,
UC Davis (2015)
$500/railcar, $1600/
terminal bin
Terminal test rate 60% Assumed
Price reduction $4/bushel AAFC (2015)
Contamination tolerance 5% CGC (2015)
Penalty limit for a farmer $ 18,000 Ministry of Justice
(2015)
Contamination multiplier dependable Calculated
Technology k 0.05e Assumed
a Bushel equivalents per tonne are 36.74 (Alberta Agriculture and Forestry,
2015).
b This is the quantity contained in a one time delivery for a farmer. However, a
farmer may deliver many times during the season.
c This represents the loading capacity of grain trucks or railcars which are
commonly used for grain transportation in the Canadian Prairies.
d This represents an economical and efﬁcient way to ship wheat for a single
railcar shipment.
e Under given penalty levels and possible testing regimes, this technology
parameter value renders the FMR range from 1% to 0.3% (refer to Eq. (3)). While
understanding that such a FMR interval may overestimate current FMR in Western
Canada, we believe it represents an appropriate misrepresentation level interval
and allows us to examine how the testing regimes examined in this study perform.
If the k value is set too low (for example at 0.01), this means FMR ranges from 0.1%
to 0.06%, at which point testing becomes trivial: there will be no testing on truck
deliveries or bins or railcars.
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3 and 4 due to detected primary and terminal bin contamination;
(iii) tracing costs (retained sample testing) from traceability; and
(iv) recovered losses (collected misrepresentation penalties) from
traceability. In sum, these processes generate the following cost
function (also refer to Table 2 for a listing of components):
= × + × + × + ×
( )
+
× + × + ×
( )
+ × ( + + ) + × ( + ) + ×
( )
− ( × + × + × )
( ) ( )
j
c E c E c E c E
i
f E f E f E
ii
c E E E c E E c E
iii
f E f E f E
iv 2
p P p
1
1 1 2 5 3 11 4 16
2 6 3 12 4 17
1 7 8 9 2 13 14 3 18
2 6 3 12 4 17
Next, a farmer’s cost includes (i) revenue (or price) loss at test
point 1; (ii) a contamination penalty due to identiﬁed mis-
representation through traceability; (iii) risk control effort costs.
This generates the following individual farmer cost function:
= ×
( )
+ × + × + ×
( )
+
( ) ( )
J
f E
i
f E f E f E
ii
c q
iii 3
e
2
1 3 2 6 3 12 4 17
In this model, for tractability the optimization problems ap-
plicable to both Eqs. (2) and (3) are subject to the following
constraints2:2 Based on the Canadian Grain Act (Ministry of Justice, 2015), the maximum
value of a penalty for an individual farmer for a delivery is $18,000. In this analysis,
if the calculated penalty amount for a farmer exceeds this maximum value, the
farmer will only pay that amount and the primary elevator will absorb the rest.( − )≤ ≤ ≤ c 1f m q f m m q f m m m q$18, 000 ; $18, 000 ; $18, 000 ;2 1 2 3 1 2 2 4 1 2 3 2
α β β β β≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ( − )0 1; 0 1; 0 1; 0 1; 0 1 c 21 1 3 4
Our assumed diminishing marginal effect of risk control effort
means that completely eliminating misrepresentation risks incurs
high effort costs. Allowing for this, any rational farmer prefers a
ﬁnite level of effort which in turn exposes her/him to a certain
level of misrepresentation risk. The farmer’s optimal mis-
representation level can be found by minimizing the objective
function deﬁned by Eq. (3). Eq. (2) indicates α= −c k lne . After
replacing ce into Eq. (3) and then taking the ﬁrst order condition
with respect to α, one yields:
α
β β β β β β
β β β β
=
+ ( − ) + ( − )( − )
+ ( − )( − )( − ) ( )
k
f f m f m m
f m m m
1 1 1
1 1 1 4
1 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3
4 1 2 3 1 2 3 4
Implications of this solution are consistent with the arguments
of Pouliot and Sumner (2008), Starbird (2000), and Starbird and
Amanor-Boadu (2006) that the costs associated with potentially
being caught under misrepresentation constitute a potential de-
terrent to farmers and should provide enough incentive for them
to produce and deliver into the supply chain accurately re-
presented and eligible products.
We replace Eq. (4) into Eq. (2). With the exogenously given
handling system structure, penalty mechanism, sample testing
cost and elevator testing regime on terminal bins, this leaves three
control variables that the elevator handlers can choose for mini-
mizing their handling costs. These are the testing rates for trucks
at test point 1, testing rates for primary bins at test point 2, and
test rates for rail cars at test point 3. The cost optimization pro-
blem can be solved with assumed values of interest with respect to
the variables and parameters in Eq. (2). The optimal solutions will
be shown later in Sections 5 and 6.
4.3. Parameters, variables and values
Listed in Table 2 are all of the variables, parameters as well as
assumed values (as well as the source of the assumed value, if
applicable) used to solve the model.
4.4. Contamination multipliers
To appropriately model the future Canadian wheat handling
system and formulate the research problem, it is essential to in-
tegrate the wheat contamination dynamics into the system cost
function. The challenge is how to quantify contamination at each
wheat transfer point after misrepresented wheat gets unloaded
into the primary bins and/or moves into the handling system.
First, we need to identify the contamination patterns occurring
if misrepresented wheat enters the supply chain. As prior work by
Ge (2013) has described, contamination from misrepresentation
can manifest in different ways. Contamination can occur in such a
way that, for example, two or more misrepresented truck de-
liveries contaminate just one bin or conversely that one mis-
represented truck delivery contaminates two different bins. In
turn, a railcar might be loaded with wheat from the same bin,
either clean or contaminated, or loaded with wheat from two
different bins, one clean and the other contaminated. In the latter
cases, additional uncontaminated wheat will become con-
taminated. In the same way contaminated wheat loaded into a
railcar might be unloaded into two different terminal bins or
conversely contaminated wheat from two or more different rail-
cars might be unloaded into one terminal bin. Thus with different
contamination patterns, contamination can spread in a nonlinear
Table 3
Contamination multipliers.
Stage Contamination source Quantity contaminated Contamination multiplier
Primary bin β α( − ) q1 1 β α( − ) qm1 1 1 (i.e., E4 in Table 1) m1
Railcar β β α( − )( − ) qm1 12 1 1 β β α( − )( − ) qm m1 12 1 1 2 (i.e., E10 in Table 1) m2
Terminal bin β β β α( − )( − )( − ) qm m1 1 13 2 1 1 2 β β β α( − )( − )( − ) qm m m1 1 13 2 1 1 2 3 (i.e., E15 in Table 1) m3
Fig. 2. Regression for Simulated m1.
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wheat can generate different contamination levels at any of the
primary bin, railcar or terminal storage stage, with commingling
rates of contaminated wheat being different from case to case.
Simply put, contaminated wheat located at one stage will be-
come contaminated source wheat at the next stage of the supply
chain if it is allowed to move farther into the handling system
undetected. Normally, the volume of contaminated wheat will not
be less than that of the contamination source. To quantify this
effect, we introduce a contamination multiplier (see Table 3). The
contamination multiplier value m represents the ratio of the vo-
lume of contaminated wheat in the system to the volume of
contaminated source wheat, i.e., contamination at each stage will
render the total contaminated volume of wheat in the system be
m times as much as the volume of contamination source.
With conditions predetermined by variable and parameter
values as shown in Table 2, when a certain amount of mis-
represented wheat enters the supply chain system, we assume
wheat contamination will follow set patterns, rendering the con-
tamination expansion quantiﬁable. Due to the complexity of the
contamination patterns, quantifying m directly through a mathe-
matical derivation would make the model very difﬁcult to solve
analytically. Thus we develop a virtual wheat supply chain system
with the structure and characteristics consistent to those we
clariﬁed in this section and obtain operational data using numer-
ical simulations and then use these data to estimate our con-
tamination multiplier functions.
For the same volume, wheat with a higher commingling rate
can potentially contaminate more eligible wheat than one with a
lower commingling rate. We assume that the commingling rates of
misrepresented trucks in the system are homogenous at 100%. The
commingling rate of contaminated wheat at the primary elevator
bins will differ due to either varying quantity of contaminated
sourced wheat or through different contamination patterns. Such
commingling rate heterogeneity adds difﬁculty for quantifying the
contamination effects at the sequent railcar and terminal elevator
stages.
With respect to our contamination multiplier regression esti-
mates, we recognize that the soundness of this analysis will be
improved if the commingling rate of the contamination source can
be incorporated as an additional explanatory variable, together
with the quantity of the contamination source wheat. But the
complexity of the contamination patterns render mathematical
representation of commingling rates essentially unobtainable in
cases of contamination through the system. In such a situation,
there is no way to integrate the commingling rate into the model.
So for simplicity, in the contamination multiplier functions (re-
gressions) we consider the quantity of contamination source
wheat as the only explanatory variable. In fact, the quantity of
contaminated wheat performs well in explaining contamination
effects in our regressions.
For m1 and m2, we assume the value of the contamination
multiplier has a linear relationship with the quantity of con-
tamination source wheat. For m3, we chose a polynomial func-
tional form to better approximate the pattern of simulated data:
β α^ = + × ( − ) ( )m a b qm1 51 1 1 1 1β β α^ = + × ( − )( − ) ( )m a b qm1 1 62 2 2 2 1 1
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
β β β α
β β β α
^ = + × ( − )( − )( − )
+ × ( − )( − )( − ) ( )
m a b qm m
b qm m
1 1 1
1 1 1 7
3 3 3
1
3 2 1 1 2
3
2
3 2 1 1 2
2
The simulation is designed to monitor the contamination
multiplier effects if a varying volume of misrepresented wheat
enters the system. The possible volume of misrepresented de-
liveries ranges from 1 to 10 truckloads, so that contamination
sources beyond 10 truckloads are not considered in this simula-
tion. If the number of misrepresented truckloads is more than 10
(i.e., a misrepresentation rate 46.1% with 180 farmers in the
model), the elevator is assumed to take complete testing at the
ﬁrst test point (Ge, 2013). In this case, there is no chance for any
misrepresented wheat to enter the supply chain system.
We set the simulation for 10 individual cases where an original
contamination source of 1–10 truckloads enters the system re-
spectively. Subsequently we assumed the testing rate for primary
elevator bins (test 2) starts from 0% and increases by 2% each time
until the value reaches 100% in each case. These 50 differently
assumed test rates let varying levels of contaminated wheat with
different levels of commingling rates get loaded on railcars from
primary elevator bins and then get unloaded into terminal elevator
bins without testing (i.e. assuming railcar test rate equal to zero in
each case). Totally 50 data samples are generated by the simula-
tion for each case. These 10 cases allow for 500 data samples that
can be used to estimate each of the three multiplier functions.
To reduce variation and generate large sample results, the si-
mulation results reported here were averaged from 10,000 itera-
tions of the computational execution. The wheat contamination
simulation was coded and compiled using Matlab, while execution
was performed on a High Performance Computing System (20
cores/2.84 GHz CPU/256GB RAM per server) and took almost 12
hours.
4.5. Generating contamination multipliers using simulated data
First, we illustrate the simulated contamination situation at the
primary elevator stage. As shown in Fig. 2, the 50 simulated data
points almost overlap with each other in each of 10 cases. As a
result, the value of contamination multiplier has a perfect negative
relationship with contamination source wheat. This phenomena
stems from both the homogeneity of contamination source wheat
in each case (wheat unloaded into primary elevator bins from
Fig. 3. Regression for Simulated m2.
H. Ge et al. / Int. J. Production Economics 179 (2016) 228–238234misrepresented trucks without being tested) and the commingling
rate (100%) of the contamination source wheat in these cases. The
total volume of contaminated wheat increases with the con-
tamination source but in a decreasing rate, indicated by the value
m1. An explanation for this result is that when two or more mis-
represented trucks enter the supply chain, it is possible several
misrepresented trucks are assigned to the same bin, thus reducing
the contamination magnitude.
At the railcar level, it is entirely possible that wheat loaded
from a contaminated bin could contaminate other eligible wheat.
The contamination situation at the railcar stage is slightly different
from that at the primary elevator stage. As shown in Fig. 3, the
varying bin test rates in each case of the simulation generate
varying magnitude of contamination of source wheat at the railcar
stage. In addition, there are differing commingling rates of con-
tamination source wheat with differing levels of contamination
effects across cases. These factors jointly lead to a divergence in
the simulated data. Similar to the situation with m1, the value of
the multiplier m2 decreases with the volume of the contamination
sources. The reason for this is that the number of clean bins de-
creases when more bins are contaminated. Under this situation,
the chance is lowered that contaminated wheat in a bin will be
loaded on the same railcar together with clean wheat from an-
other, thereby reducing the contamination effect.
Normally, the farther contaminated wheat moves in the supply
chain, the more wheat will be contaminated. If contaminated
wheat in primary bins is loaded on railcars and moved to a
terminal elevator and then unloaded into terminal bins, con-
tamination will magnify. If wheat in railcars loaded from a con-
taminated primary bin is unloaded to one terminal bin or two
different terminal bins, it can readily contaminate other eligible
wheat. As shown in Fig. 4, the heterogeneous commingling rates of
contamination source wheat create somewhat diverse patterns in
the simulated data. Even so, the consistent negative relationship
between the multiplier value and the volume of contamination
source wheat is noteworthy.
Based on our simulated data regarding the quantity of con-
taminated source wheat and contaminated wheat, we develop
regression relationships for our contamination multipliers. The
results indicate that the quantity of contaminated source wheat
(independent variable) explains the magnitude of contaminationFig. 4. Regression for Simulated m3.multiplier (dependent variable) very well. These regressions are
shown in Table 4.5. Model solutions and ﬁndings
Now we can place the three multiplier functions for m1, m2 and
m3 into Eq. (2). These functions integrate into the model varying
contamination effects resulting from undetected and mis-
represented wheat at each stage of the supply chain. Given certain
values of interest with respect to the variables and parameters as
shown in Table 2, this cost optimization problem is solvable. For
simplicity, we plot values of the cost function for all possible
combinations of truck test rates and primary bin test rates, helping
us to identify the minimum value of the cost function. For this
situation, the global solution we ﬁnd is unique – the handlers
should test primary bins at a rate of approximately 4%, and to
ensure minimum handling costs, handlers should conduct no ad-
ditional testing at either the truck (i.e., β = 01 ) or railcar test point
(i.e., β = 03 ). Fig. 5(a)–(c) illustrates the varying responses of the
elevator's handling costs to the changes of the other two test rates
while one test rate is ﬁxed at its optimal value, along with the
corresponding range of FMR values. As indicated by the red dots
marked in each frame of Fig. 5, the total costs attributed to ele-
vator handlers are $53,964 and the corresponding optimal FMR is
0.66% under the optimal test regime.
As mentioned above, the optimal testing solutions shown here
are derived within an operational context for the foreseeable fu-
ture of the wheat handling system. The FMR applied in the model
is likely greater than the one applicable to the current situation, so
the solved testing regimes are not necessarily applicable to current
wheat handling system. If actual FMR is at a lower level approx-
imating what we believe to be current FMR levels, for example an
FMR of less than 0.5%, in fact we ﬁnd that no testing should be
performed at any of the three test points. These ﬁndings support
current wheat variety testing strategies in the Canadian wheat
supply chain system. At the moment, visually indistinguishable
wheat varieties have not yet entered the system in large volumes
and as of this writing there are few reported misrepresentation
cases. Considering what must be an extremely low FMR, elevator
handlers thus undertake no truck testing nor bin testing for vari-
ety identiﬁcation in the current wheat handling system (Blom-
quist, 2015; Skinner, 2015).
The solutions shown are subject to speciﬁc values of variables
chosen for the elevator and farmer's objective functions. But since
agriculture is undergoing dramatic change, it is very likely that
economic and operational environments described here are evol-
ving through time. Any changes in these values will reshape the
optimal testing protocols for misrepresentation or contamination
detection. Exploring the response of testing strategies to a range of
possible variable values is the focus of the next section.6. Sensitivity analysis
We next conduct sensitivity analysis for certain key parameters
or variables germane to formulating optimal test strategies, in-
cluding price reductions, changes in testing costs, as well as
changes in commingling tolerance and misrepresentation penal-
ties. Sensitivity analysis will allow ones to better understand the
full range of testing regimes’ responses to changes in environ-
mental conditions.
In the sensitivity cases we examine here, it turns out that
railcar test rates are always zero under all assumed conditions in
the analysis. This is not surprising. Under the assumption that
there are no wheat contamination sources other than farmer
Table 4
Regressions for contamination multipliers.
Dependent variables Independent variables Coefﬁcients t Stat P-value F R2
Multiplier m1 Intercept 6.541 7020 0 381366 0.999
X 6.310E-5 617 0
Multiplier m2 Intercept 1.113 5876 0 3859 0.885
X 3.486E-7 62 1.1E-236
Multiplier m3 Intercept 1.579 1266 0 707 0.740
X 2.146E-7 3.02 0.003
X2 9.7E-12 11.82 1.41E-28
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points are available in the supply chain, railcar testing is rendered
cost ineffective since the vast majority of contamination will have
already been prevented or caught. Due to this, railcar test rates are
not included in the following ﬁgures illustrating model
sensitivities.
6.1. Price margins
The prices of food eligible wheat and downgraded (i.e., feed)
wheat ﬂuctuate over time. As a result, the price margin between
food eligible wheat and feed wheat also varies with time. The
changes in price margin play a signiﬁcant role in reshaping opti-
mal testing strategies.
As shown in Fig. 6, when the price margin between food and
feed wheat is at a low level, i.e., from 0 to $3.85, no testing is
suggested for either the test points. An increase in these price
margins widens the potential loss for both farmers and elevators,
so that the elevator's testing incentives increase with the magni-
tude of price margins. When the price margins increase to a level
more than $3.85, proportional testing at the second test point is
optimal. When the price margin is greater than $7.35, testing will
switch to full testing of truck deliveries at the ﬁrst test point. In the
latter case, to avoid the high cost of downgrading via contamina-
tion, it is best to detect all original misrepresented deliveries be-
fore they enter the supply chain.
6.2. Testing costs
While current variety identiﬁcation methods are accurate and
replicable, they are laboratory based, require skilled technicians
and to date, are not widely available. They are relatively expensive
and take time to yield results. The CGC has been putting efforts
into developing a rapid and affordable variety identiﬁcation
technology to facilitate and monitor the purity of variety speciﬁc
segregation. If this technology proves successful, it would con-
stitute a major step forward for reducing test costs and hence
could inﬂuence testing strategies along the wheat supply chain.
Allowing for the potential test cost reduction in the future, we
consider a value interval for truck testing cost [0, $400]/sample, or
[0, $0.27] /bushel. We further assume that the primary elevator bin
and terminal elevator bin sample testing cost changes remain in
our original proportions of 1:3:1.25:4 (refer to Table 2) as related
to truck testing costs, where the truck test cost is normalized to
unity.
A high test cost weakens handlers’ economic incentive to test.
Just as Fig. 7 shows, when the test cost is higher than $0.29/bushel,
no testing is conducted. The incentive to test increases with the
reduction in testing cost. When the total test cost falls from $0.29/
bushel to $0.11/bushel, the primary bin test rate increases from
0 to 0.88 while in the meantime, the truck testing rate remainszero. When the overall test cost is lower than $0.11/bushel, the
testing strategy switches to testing all the trucks. In this way,
testing strategies continue to seek a balance between testing costs
and contamination detection. The elevator's test costs and con-
tamination losses decrease when the testing cost falls. In light of
this, it is clear that a rapid and affordable variety identiﬁcation
technology for testing will improve the functional performance
and efﬁciency of this supply chain.
6.3. Contamination tolerance levels
If detected, any wheat delivery in which undesirable classes
exceed speciﬁed tolerance will be downgraded to feed, resulting in
losses for supply chain participants. The contamination issue could
become even more important in the presence of non-registered
genetically modiﬁed (GM) varieties. Although no GM wheat has
been approved in Canada and the U.S. for commercial planting and
sale, eligible wheat could become contaminated with GM wheat
illegally grown or grown in testing ﬁelds. A notable example is the
GM wheat contamination that occurred in Oregon in 2013 which
greatly harmed the reputation and customer trust of U.S. pro-
duction and threatened U.S exports. As is well known, the inter-
national food safety threshold for GM wheat contamination has
been kept very strict. As an example, the EU operates using a 0.001
threshold of GM contamination. Only recently has the European
Commission issued a proposal to drop the policy of zero tolerance
for unapproved and untested GMOs in food.
Here we examine how testing strategies respond to more
stringent tolerances for undesired wheat. Results are shown in
Fig. 8. When contamination tolerance becomes more stringent, the
values of the contamination multipliers grow, i.e., for a given
quantity of contamination source wheat, more wheat could meet
the contamination threshold and be downgraded to feed wheat in
the case of contamination. This motivates additional efforts of
wheat handlers to enhance contamination testing. Our ﬁndings
suggest that the testing intensity for primary elevator bins in-
creases when the contamination tolerance becomes stricter. And
here, when the tolerance is less than 0.003, complete testing on
primary elevators is considered optimal.
6.4. Penalty levels
We propose there are two methods that could be used to deter
misrepresentation behavior and thus reduce contamination risks.
These are a penalty system and a liability system. By deﬁnition, a
penalty system would make handlers share the losses from farmer
misrepresentation, while a liability systemwould force losses to be
unconditionally covered by offenders. We note that handlers have
no economic incentive to prevent farmer misrepresentation at all
in a liability system. Thus, a penalty system should be preferred to
a liability system for supporting quality assurance in the new
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Fig. 5. Optimal solution for test rates and corresponding FMR.
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Under a penalty system, the amount of the penalty cannot be
unbounded, but would need to be carefully regulated. Note that if
handlers are free to set a penalty imposed on an offender so that
the contamination losses from misrepresentation can be covered
completely, a penalty system will provide no economic incentives
on handlers for food risk control, in a manner similar to the lia-
bility system.Under given levels of a misrepresentation penalty, a handler's
testing strategies change the distribution of risk sharing between
the farmer and the primary elevator. As shown in Fig. 9 for our
model, when the penalty limit is at a low level, e.g. 0–$9961,
complete testing on the truck is necessary due to the high FMR
resulting from the low misrepresentation penalty. When the
penalty limit increases from $9962 to $19,682, a proportional test
on the primary elevator bin is proposed, while the test intensity
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Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis – Test cost.
Fig. 8. Sensitivity analysis – Contamination tolerance.
Fig. 9. Sensitivity analysis – Penalty levels.
H. Ge et al. / Int. J. Production Economics 179 (2016) 228–238 237decreases with the value of penalty. The elevator's potential losses
from contamination decrease as the penalty limit increases, dis-
couraging handlers’ testing efforts. When the penalty limit is
greater than $19,682, as mentioned the optimal handling strategy
is no testing.
Handling costs decrease sharply when the limit increases
through the $10,000–$40,000 interval. The FMR markedly de-
creases and the farmer's cost increases in this interval. In reality,
the current maximum penalty for an individual farmer is set at
$18,000. This is not high (by our measure) and is in fact located in
the middle of the interval. We conclude that a slight increase in
the current penalty level can improve overall system efﬁciency. As
shown in Fig. 9, when the penalty limit is over $70,000, the ele-
vator's cost function becomes very ﬂat, while the FMR and the
farmer's cost function become ﬂat as well. We also observe that
there are few beneﬁts associated with a penalty increase for re-
ducing the misrepresentation rate and handling costs when the
penalty limit is set beyond $70,000.
Although a penalty and enforcement system for wheat quality
surely represents an attempt to guard against certain undesirable
system outcomes, ideally any economic system should avoid the
tendency to overkill with an excess of rules and procedures in a
quest to ensure that those undesirable outcomes can never occur.
Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd once again that there needs to be a
balance struck in this new wheat handling system between
bearing risks and inducing regulatory overload.7. Conclusions
Considering the changes in wheat varietal testing that have
recently been enacted in the Canadian wheat handling system,
sustained and imaginative modeling efforts are needed to under-
stand the consequences of these policy changes as well as to
identify effective handling strategies and policies to maintain the
historical integrity of the supply chain. To date, few comprehen-
sive studies have been done to address potential risks associated
with these policy changes, or explore risk mitigation strategies in
the new trust system. In this work, after characterizing the basic
analytics of the problem motivating the analysis, we explicitly
model the Canadian wheat supply chain in a realistic manner and
then develop testing strategies that most efﬁciently balance the
tradeoff between testing costs and contamination risks.
The speciﬁcation of appropriate wheat handling strategies in
the supply chain can be formulated as system optimization
H. Ge et al. / Int. J. Production Economics 179 (2016) 228–238238problems. In contrast to much of the extant literature, we develop
a unique hybrid optimization-simulation model and ﬁnd global
solutions to the potential wheat contamination problem. Numer-
ical simulation is used as a complementary tool to integrate
complex characteristics of the system into the optimization model.
Simulated model output is used to generate realistic wheat con-
tamination data under various scenarios, enabling the develop-
ment of key functional forms for our contamination multipliers, all
helping to better quantify contamination effects and dynamics in
the Canadian wheat supply chain.
The analysis generates a set of testing strategies to minimize
the risks and costs of contamination to participants under fore-
seeable wheat handling scenarios. Testing locations and intensity
are determined by the level of contamination risks from wheat
misrepresentation. In essence, the more serious the contamination
risks, the earlier the test point that must be chosen for testing.
Comparatively, this means truck and primary bin test points have
more important roles in minimizing contamination losses in the
supply chain than the railcar test point. The structure of the supply
chain matters - the assumed availability of these two test points
renders the railcar test point unnecessary. While high testing costs
and a low penalty for farmer misrepresentation weaken the wheat
handler's incentives to test for contamination along the supply
chain, alternatively tight commingling thresholds and high price
margins between eligible wheat and (downgraded) feed wheat
encourage more contamination testing. These ﬁndings have direct
implications for the optimal testing strategy for risk mitigation
under certain operational conditions.
In addition to the model's policy implications and methodolo-
gical contribution, this study also addresses a historical policy is-
sue about wheat quality within the Canadian wheat industry. But
similar issues related to food safety and supply chains will develop
across many countries and commodities. These could include
other wheat sectors across the globe (including the EU and Aus-
tralia), while this very issue seems to be an emerging problem for
soybeans in the United States. We believe the policy issue ad-
dressed in this study as related to food safety and quality will
essentially be “re-discovered” for other crops and regions of the
globe. Hence, our framework can be expected to retain its inﬂu-
ence as researchers in the future look to address similar supply
chain and food safety problems elsewhere.References
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